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Abstract
The paper engages the problematic of platform capitalism in the company of Fernand
Braudel. Platform capitalism is accordingly located in the opaque zone of the so-called
antimarket, “where the great predators roam,” with its characteristic conditions of mo-
nopolization, concentrated economic and political power, and cultures of systematic reg-
ulatory evasion. The Braudelian schema requires that platform capitalism is situated, both
historically and geographically, in this case both as a distinctive conjunctural moment and
as an epiphenomenon of variegated and globalizing processes of financialization and ne-
oliberalization. The paper offers an antidote to the mainstream treatment of platforms,
with its technological exuberance, its preoccupation with internally generated dynamics,
and its exaggerated claims to novelty and indeed revolutionary significance. Thinking con-
juncturally about platform capitalism qua Braudelian capitalism does not just counter
these problems, it represents a constructive supplement to extant political-economy ac-
counts. It accentuates and problematizes non-repeating historical continuities (against
presumptions of a radical technological-organizational break). And it points to consti-
tutive conditions of coexistence (against the imaginary of a separate, self-propelling, and
distinct innovation economy). To pose the platform question along with Braudel is to
begin with problematics of monopoly power and antimarket behavior, rather than with
technological affordances, network capacities, or the market.
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1 Introduction: Confronting PlatformCapitalism
In this paper we make common cause with those developing critical readings of platform capi-
talism from vantage points grounded in heterodox political economy. This work has provided
amuch-needed antidote to some of themost problematic features of mainstream commentary
on the platform moment, with its self-regarding technological hubris, its excitable assertions
of unprecedented novelty, and its tendency to minimize both historical precedents and con-
stitutive conditions of (co)existence with financialized capitalism. Political economists of var-
ious stripes have offered a series of alternative interpretations, many of them highlighting the
remarkable powers and extensive reach of Big Tech, the pervasive exploitation of gig workers
and other so-called independent contractors, the routine circumvention by platform corpora-
tions of regulatory frameworks and taxation systems, the everyday abuses ofmarket power, and
much more.
In one such alternative account, recently published in this journal, Grabher and König
(2020) mobilize a post-Polanyian approach to cut a distinctive and productive path between
binary readings of the platform-mediated future, which have become polarized between sunny
premonitions of a post-capitalist “sharing economy” and grim portents of an uber-capitalist
condition of undiluted corporate rule. Working creatively with the Polanyian legacy, Grabher
and Königmake the case for a substantivist engagement with platforms as “emergingmodes of
socioeconomic coordination that cannot be mapped onto the existing register of governance
mechanisms,” tracing the roots of the platform economy to a “complex alchemy of political, so-
cietal, institutional, and technological ingredients” (Grabher&König, 2020, pp. 96–97). They
deflate the bubble of techno-futurism that has done so much to obfuscate assessments of this
significant phenomenon, while also deconstructing pervasive discourses of “revolutionary” dis-
ruption. Yet there is an aspect of their framing question—post-capitalism or uber-capitalism?
— that promptly recedes from view: the question of capitalism itself. Now, Polanyi’s own cri-
tique of capitalism was also incomplete in some respects, notwithstanding his significant con-
tributions to the understanding of marketization, liberalization, and socioeconomic transfor-
mation (see Peck, 2013; Block & Somers, 2014; Dale, 2016; Fraser, 2017). For these and other
reasons, the search for a complete, discrete, and unified Polanyian method seems destined to
remain a frustrated one. Considerably more generative, however, has been the practice of read-
ing Polanyi alongside others, and in the spirit of and/also conversations rather than either/or
debates. It is in this spirit, that of a supplement rather than a replacement, that we proceed
here, proposing to complement the post-Polanyian framing proposed by Grabher and König,
with which we broadly sympathize, with a parallel reading that takes its cues from the work of
another heterodox and somewhat idiosyncratic theorist, Fernand Braudel.
Not unlike Polanyi, Braudel combined original and capacious thinking with a rather
undisciplined writing style and sometimes inconsistent formulations, marrying encyclopedic
inquiries with a reluctance to totalize or systematize. Neither Polanyi nor Braudel had
any time for stage models, teleology, and economism, both instead practicing “exchangist”
modes of analysis and tending to favor rhetorical exegesis, indexed to concrete historical
situations, over rigorous abstraction or theoretical dogma. Crucially, both Polanyi and
Braudel understood the economy to be a house of many rooms, but if the Polanyian triptych
(market exchange, reciprocity, redistribution) presents as a horizontal one, Braudel’s is more
hierarchical (material life, market economy, capitalism). For Braudel, the material economy
of everyday life represents a base of sorts (“the soil into which capitalism thrusts its roots
but which it can never really penetrate”), over which is layered the more familiar and indeed
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“favored terrain of the market economy,” but atop of all of which stands, at the apex of this
pyramidal conception, the shadowy “zone of the anti-market […] the real home of capitalism”
(Braudel, 1982, pp. 229–230, emphasis added). This hierarchical conception is joined
with a subtle sense of the dynamic “social geographies” of the globalizing economy, which
Braudel understands to be “neither homogenous or straightforward” (Germain, 1996, p. 205),
comprising a mutating plurality of “world-economies” (Weltwirtschaft). In dialogue with
these vivid formulations, the present paper considers how the platform moment, rather than
representing some revolutionary break, reflects and refracts rhythmic currents in the historical
geography of (monopolizing) capitalism. Taking cues from Braudel, we argue that the real
home of platform capitalism is the zone of the antimarket, a murky but dominating layer
located above the competition, where it operates as a new machine with an old purpose: that
of controlling markets from above and, in the process, generating significant concentrations
of political-economic power.
Since our goal here is to supplement rather than supplant the productive array of political-
economic treatments of platform capitalism (see, for example, Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Lan-
gley & Leyshon, 2017; Srnicek, 2017a; Montalban et al., 2019), we set out to explore the dis-
tinctive potential of a Braudelian approach, which can be read as both affirming and adding to
these extant treatments. We offer this Braudelian perspective not as partisans of longue-durée
historical analysis, but on the grounds that it brings something distinctive to what should re-
main aheterodox, plural, andopen conversation. Asking theplatformquestion in the company
Braudel is to beginwithproblematics ofmonopoly power and antimarket behavior, rather than
with technological affordances, network capacities, or (distortions of) the market. It is categor-
ically not to say, we emphasize, that the platform phenomenon can simply be retrofitted into
some standard-issuemodel of capitalism, understood as auniversal andunchanging system, less
still that Amazon and Facebook are but new iterations of the Dutch trading houses Sixteenth
Century. It is, instead, to take inspiration, and a series of conceptual cues, from the Braudelian
system of thought. Braudel’s approach to capitalism is certainly expansive, but great store was
also set by attending to its shape-shifting mutations over time and across space. To the extent
that capitalism exhibits a “certain unity,” he argues, this is realized through a constellation of
recurrent tendencies grounded in “its unlimited flexibility, its capacity for change and adap-
tation” (Braudel, 1982, p. 433, original emphasis). “The worst error of all,” he reflects, “is to
suppose that capitalism is simply an ‘economic system,’ whereas in fact it lives off the social or-
der, standing almost on a footing with the state, whether as adversary or accomplice” (Braudel,
1984, p. 623, emphasis added). To think about platforms along with Braudel, then, is to prob-
lematize both their conjunctural specificity and their positions on the moving terrain of an
always-mutating capitalism.
Engaging especially with the striking image of the antimarket, the home of the big beasts of
capitalism, “where the great predators roam and the law of the jungle operates” (Braudel, 1982,
p. 230), we set out in this paper to develop a Braudel-inspired sketch of the platform conjunc-
ture, drawing on three conceptual devices borrowed from the historian’s analytical repertoire.
The following sectionbeginswith the antimarket, the contre-marché, confronting the decidedly
anticompetitive culture of the platform economy, with its new modalities of monopoly rule.
The second part of the paper takes as its point of departure Braudel’s image of zones d’opacité
— his portrayal of capitalism as a dimly-lit overworld — exploring how pervasive discourses
of technological futurism, novelty, incommensurability, and endogenous, self-propelling dy-
namics continue to obscure the ways in which platform modes of (corporate) organization
are coproduced with (and coexist dynamically with) entrenched features of contemporary cap-
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italist development, including deep financialization and dysfunctional regulation. Then, in
the third section of the paper, we turn to the emergent spatialities of platform capitalism as
a variegated and conjunctural form(ation), insinuated as it is into everyday life and various
(de)regulatory settlements, while at the same time residing in the ethereal space of the “cloud.”
Here, Braudel’s novel conception of “world-economies” — as the coexisting fragments of an
emergent globality, each with their own power centers and patterns of concentrated control—
once again prompts some searching questions. The paper is concluded with some comments
on the nature of platform power.
2 Where the Great Predators Roam
Immanuel Wallerstein once wrote that Braudel “viewed capitalism in a way that, in the eyes
of most of his colleagues, could only be termed seeing it ‘upside down’ ” (1991, p. 354). The
Braudelian schema upends dominant understandings of capitalism in two ways. First, in con-
trast to conventional expectations of a prevailing trend towards competitive markets, Braudel
holds that the recurrent tendencies in capitalism are for concentration and monopolization,
culminating in his contrarian formulation of the antimarket. Second, against the presumption
that capitalist development entails ever-more intricate divisions of labor, hemaintains that cap-
italists are characteristically averse not just to competition but also to specialization, while dis-
playing promiscuous appetites for “avaricious speculation.” His rendering of the antimarket as
the “real home of capitalism” is not just different to the orthodox tale of the market economy,
with its self-regulating laws of competition, it (co)exists in a parasitic fashion with this “sunlit
world” of appearances, relying uponbut at the same time loomingmenacingly above the “trans-
parent” domain of market exchange and the economies of everyday life as well. Apprehended
as a world “out of the ordinary,” the capitalist antimarket is “a shadowy zone, a twilight area of
activities [that is nevertheless positioned] at the very root of what is encompassed by the term
capitalism” (Braudel, 1982, pp. 405, 22). The real home of capitalism, then, is not an exten-
sion ofmarkets andmarket rationality, not even a distortion of competitive logics. For Braudel,
it is more like an inversion, an overworld of concentrated power and superprofits, located on
the other side of an opaquemirror; la zone du contre-marché is where the big beasts roam, their
powers largely unchecked. This is an “anti-market in the sense that it can only exist and prosper
through continual disruption from a distance of the circular flow of economic life” (Arrighi,
2001, p. 121).
Braudel’s graphic portrayal of capitalism does not imply singularity in form or indeed uni-
lateral dominance. Capitalism is understood as a “predatory” system, living off the layers of
economic life below, but also a polymorphic one: the “plurality of capitalism [goes] back a
longway” (Braudel, 1984, p. 604). The uneven and episodic effects of finance capitalism figure
prominently in this historically constructed understanding, but Braudel’s longue-durée read-
ing of the transformations of capitalist power is particularly concernedwith the activities of the
trading classes, and with the interrelationships between merchant capital, market economies,
and states. Historically, the merchant-capitalists, notably those that came to dominate long-
distance trade by stitching together smaller and localized markets in search of the highest rates
of return, derived their uniquely profitable positions from “the concentrations [that these ar-
rangements] made possible,” generating in the process “an unrivalled machine for the rapid
reproduction and increase of capital” (Braudel, 1982, p. 408, original emphasis). These traders
(les négociants) were in the business of intermediation, but hardly mere go-betweens. They
were aggregators, positioned above the fray:
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The great “merchants” of the past never specialized: they went in indiscriminately,
simultaneously or successively, for trade, banking, finance, speculation on the
Stock Exchange, “industrial” production, whether under the putting-out system
or more rarely in manufactories (Braudel, 1984, p. 621).
The merchant capitalists reaped “the fruit of monopoly,” inMaurice Dobb’s terms, by way of
extractive and predatory actions articulatedwith themarket sphere (an arena of “small profits,”
for Braudel), but once removed from quotidian worlds of the everyday economy: “the remark-
able gains ofmerchant capital in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries […]were acquired by an
exclusion of the mass of the producers from sharing in the benefits of an expanded volume of
trade rather than by any actual depression of the general standard of life” (Dobb, 1950, p. 119).
Banaji (2020, pp. 120–121) likewise observes that, over the centuries, “there [has been] practi-
cally no sector or type of investment that [merchants] did not invade, exploit, or monopolize.”
The remarkable ascendancy of the platform monopolies in recent decades has also been
predicated on the exploitation of positions that bear little resemblance to those of ordinary
market participants down below. While it has been common for platform operators to style
themselves as enablers and intermediaries, the most successful have gone on to amass powers,
capacities, and privileges commensurate with a jurisdiction-spanning, infrastructural presence
in the economies of market exchange and everyday life (see Bratton, 2016; Kornberger et al.,
2017; Plantin et al., 2018; Clarke, 2019). As Rahman and Thelen (2019, p. 180) observe, “the
very idea of the ‘platform’ reflects an aspiration to be the foundational infrastructure of a sector
— whether it is Uber’s attempt to dominate transportation services from taxis to shipping or
Amazon’s dominance of the online retail market as a whole.” As platforms have engaged in the
insinuative practices of “infrastructuralization,” they have reshaped not just the terms of trade
but the very terrains on which it is practiced. More than this, as some platforms have morphed
into low-cost, widely accessible systems, they have come to fulfill “basic” societal functions
(Larkin, 2013), relied upon and even “loved” by their customers (Khan, 2017; Zuboff, 2019).1
Platform operators “are not generally buyers and sellers of goods themselves, as in a tradi-
tional production market [but instead] produce networked ‘marketplace platforms’ which in
turn provide opportunities to buy and sell — skimming a percentage of each transaction as a
middleman” (Castelle, 2016, p. 14). Since platforms are also positioned so as to exploit market
intelligence derived from these transactional spaces (a resource now conventionally described
as big data), within which they establish, maintain, and police rules of participation, their mul-
tifaceted roles clearly amount to “considerably more than just intermediation” (Christophers,
2020, p. 190). Thousands of third-party (or “complementor”) firms now conduct their busi-
ness on platforms, and according to the rules of those platforms, doing so in the context of
constrained agency and asymmetrical power relations. While some have portrayed this as a
new mode of competitive cooperation or “coopetition” (Ritala et al., 2014), third-party firms
that do their business on platforms are routinely subject to the risk of being picked off, ab-
sorbed, or consumed by the platforms themselves, while it is common for transactional rules
and even prices to be effectively dictated by the platform operators too. It has been said that
complementor firms are, by definition, “dancing with wolves” (Lan et al., 2019).
Rather than simply entering conventional markets, platforms “remake (and rematerialize)
them” (Cohen, 2019, p. 133), engendering transformative effects that exceed the meaning of
1. This calls tomind one of JoanRobinson’s (1962, p. 130) famous aphorisms, thatmight bemodified for these
digitally mediated times: platform capitalism may be “cruel, unjust, turbulent, but it does deliver the goods,
and, damn it all, it’s the goods that you want.”
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the commonly used term “disruption.” As Zysman andKenney (2018) have argued, platforms
effectively function as “regulatory structures,” enabling and dictating the terms of the interac-
tions they facilitate, and shaping the behavior of users in a fashion “geared toward the systemic
collection, algorithmic processing, circulation, andmonetization of user data” (vanDijck et al.,
2018, p. 4). This capacity to extract and capitalize on the new “resource” of big data, a defin-
ing feature of platform capitalism, enables its corporate giants to position themselves above the
market economy’s ordinary fray. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment report Power, Platforms and the Free Trade Delusion explains:
Using a combination of strengthened property rights, first-mover advantages, mar-
ket power and other uncompetitive practices […] platforms control and use digi-
tized data to organize and mediate transactions between the various actors, and
have the capability of expanding the size of such ecosystems in a circular, feedback-
driven process (UNCTAD, 2018, p. vi).
In otherwords, the intelligence that platforms routinely collect onusers—referring topersonal
characteristics, transaction histories, behavioral patterns, attitudes, and orientations — is the
fuel for those “network effects,” or demand-side economies of scale, that are said to animate
the “new economics” of the platform era (Gawer, 2014, p. 1240). Platforms “become more
valuable to each user as more people use them,” which in turn attracts more users, after which
lock-in effects heavily favor incumbents (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2017, p. 140; Parker et al.,
2016; Cusumano et al., 2019). These network effects subsequently propel a “virtuous feedback
loop that producesmonopolies” (Parker et al., 2016, p. 6),mostmature platformmarkets being
ultimately dominated by “one or two giants” (Lynch, 2017, p. 802).
Management gurus and even critical commentators are wont to ascribe network effects
with almostmagical properties, stressing their boundless capacities for generating growth, deep-
ening market dominance, and (eventually) turning a profit. In an early projection of the plat-
form imaginary, venture capitalist Marc Andreessen (2011, p. C2) declared that “software is
eating the world,” as part of a “dramatic and broad technological shift in which software com-
panies are poised to take over large swaths of the economy.” Today, platform evangelists offer a
small but significant amendment to Andreessen’s claim, contending that it is not software per
se that is eating the world, but a new and effectively contagious business model. What Sangeet
Paul Choudary (2015, p. 15) conceives as platform scale is “powered by the ability to leverage
and orchestrate a global connected system of producers and consumers toward efficient value
creation and exchange,” a new corporate model that has been rippling across sector after sector
of the (globalizing) economy. It is argued that, in contrast to the vertically integrated corpora-
tions of the Fordist era, platform operators tend to capture and consolidate markets in a more
horizontal fashion, capitalizing on what Srnicek (2017b, p. 256) describes as a “rhizomatic
form of integration.” Neither hierarchy nor market, the platform mode of organization de-
viates from the (classic) network form too, combining as it does distributed regimes of control
(which some have dubbed “putting out 2.0”) with the centralization of power (see Kornberger
et al., 2017; Watkins & Stark, 2018). Such are their capacities to co-opt, to cross-subsidize, to
loss lead, to monitor and police, and to leverage new modalities of commerce, platforms are
able to surround and swallow competitors and even entire markets. And yet these predatory
practices are “often hidden from view” (Rahman & Thelen, 2019, p. 180), including under
the benign cloak of network economics and horizontalist metaphors.
There appears to be no stopping the platform wave. The MIT Initiative on the Digital
Economy proclaims that “everywhere there can be a platform, there will be a platform” (MI-
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TIDE, 2018, emphasis added), while somewhat more soberly Peter Evans and Annabel Gawer
observe that “platform ecosystems”
are gaining ground through the digitalization of products, services and business
processes and in the process are reshaping the global landscape […] online
platforms have upended numerous brick and mortar chains and are making deep
inroads into other industries from television to transportation. Although it is
still early days, they have the potential to be equally disruptive to traditional
approaches to banking, healthcare and energy services (Evans & Gawer, 2016,
p. 4).
As Kenney et al. (2019, p. 877) astutely remark, however, ecosystem metaphors of this kind
serve an ideological purpose in that they work both to misrepresent and to conceal “power
dynamics that more closely resemble those for serfs on a feudal manor — always at the mercy
of the lord who can expropriate their business without any compensation.”
The explosive growth and colonizing effects of platform capitalism have been likened (even
by its advocates) to land grabs, in which first-movers race to secure new territories and to build
scale through the exploitationof so-callednetwork effects, subsequently to erect daunting barri-
ers to entry. Sometimes starting off in specialist or newly created niches (as in Amazon’s initial
foray into bookselling, or Uber’s original focus on ride-hailing), the engine of platform eco-
nomics is this relentless drive to scale, often juiced by significant injections of venture capital,
generating secular trends towards diversification, consolidation, and hybridization, as domi-
nant platforms leverage (market) power in one sector to override competition in others (Evans
& Gawer, 2016; Cusumano et al., 2020). Writing in the SloanManagement Review, Michael
Cusumano and colleagues predict that as the platform sector continues to proliferate laterally,
across markets, the cumulative outcome will be deepening corporate concentration, such that
“even more market power [is] concentrated in a smaller number of large platform companies”
(Cusumano et al., 2020, p. 50). Furthermore, the platform giants can be expected to develop
increasingly tangled and symbiotic relations with states, (would be) regulatory agencies, and
political elites— echoing the recurrent fusions of capitalist and state-political power described
by Braudel.
Already, the largest platforms “exercise a level of market dominance that inspires compari-
son to classicmonopolies of thenineteenth and twentieth centuries” (Rahman&Thelen, 2019,
p. 178), albeitwith a new twist. This newmanifestation ofmonopoly power is neither acquired
nor maintained through traditional forms of direct ownership — as in the monopolies of the
Gilded Age — but has instead accrued through distinctive, digitally-enabled capacities to con-
trol andmanipulatemarkets, including in a host of more distantiated and mediated ways. In
the words of digital futurist, TomGoodwin:
Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s
most popularmedia owner, creates no content. Alibaba, themost valuable retailer,
has no inventory. AndAirbnb, theworld’s largest accommodation provider, owns
no real estate. Something interesting is happening. Since the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the world has developed complex supply chains, from designers to manufac-
turers, from distributors to importers, wholesalers and retailers, it’s what allowed
billions of products to be made, shipped, bought and enjoyed in all corners of the
world. In recent times the power of the Internet, especially the mobile phone, has
unleashed a movement that’s rapidly destroying these layers and moving power
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to new places […] The new breed of companies [is] the fastest-growing in history.
[They occupy] indescribably thin layers that sit on top of vast supply systems (where
the costs are) and interface with a huge number of people (where the money is) […]
The interface layer is where all the value and profit is (2015, p. 1, emphasis added).
What the platform operators do own, of course, is the platform itself, over which they “have a
great deal of discretion” (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2017, p. 165).
We are unambiguously in the precincts, it would seem, of the “real home of capitalism,”
in which an overclass of traders and financiers “inserts itself into the chain leading from pro-
duction to wholesale trade, not seeking to take over entire responsibility for them, but to occupy
the strategic points controlling the key sectors of accumulation” (Braudel, 1984, p. 65, empha-
sis added). For Braudel, capitalists are defined not by their direct ownership of the means of
production (as in the conventional Marxist sense), or their supply of financial resources (as
neoclassical models have it), but instead by their privileged positioning, and behavior, as an
elite (over)class with the power “to manipulate the market economy and create conditions of
unequal exchange” (Bakker, 2007, p. 543). In the Braudelian account, the true capitalists are a
breed apart; they are the big beasts operating at the very top of the food chain, “where the lawof
the jungle operates,” like apex predators roaming above (and preying upon) small-time traders
and ordinary market participants below. As Samuel Kinser says of this Braudelian conception,
the “big speculators [are] another animal entirely,” their privileged preserve being
[t]he capitalist’s proper sphere […] the international world of long-distance trade
and banking, the sphere of historical grandeur and of grand profits where king-
doms and fortunes are made and unmade, by virtue of the ability of the capitalist
to cross frontiers and to profit from regional and national differentials in supply
and demand (1981b, p. 674).
Masters of arbitrage andmakers ofmonopolies, these arch-capitalists have long been renowned
for their “power, cunning, and intelligence” (Braudel, 1982, p. 418).
One does not have to look far to see Big Tech portrayed in similar terms. In Surveillance
Capitalism, for example, Zuboff (2019, p. 9) castigates the platform giants for staging “an un-
precedented market operation into the unmapped spaces of the internet, where [they have]
faced few impediments from law or competitors, like an invasive species in a landscape free of
natural predators.” Similarly, Maya McGuineas — president of the Committee for a Respon-
sible Federal Budget, a Washington-based think tank closely allied to the primary circuits of
financial and political power in the United States — warns that Big Tech’s “addiction econ-
omy” represents a mortal threat to the free-market capitalism that her organization seeks to
defend:
[T]he newpowers in the digital age have built their businessmodels on strategies—
enabled and turbo-charged by self-improving algorithms — that actively under-
mine the principles that make capitalism a good deal for most people. Their aim is
notmerely to gain and retain customers, but to create a dependency on their prod-
ucts […] The capitalism that is taking shape in this century— predatory, manipu-
lative, extremely effective at short-circuiting our rationality — is a different beast
from the classical version taught in university classrooms. It cannot be regarded as
beneficent and should not be given the benefit of the doubt. Profitmotive and the
means to create dependency is too dangerous a combination (MacGuineas, 2020,
p. 12).
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Big Tech has indeed been a pioneer of a “predatory, manipulative” style of capitalism, and
there is no question that it is a “different beast” to the entrepreneurial firm of the (neo)classical
imagination. In the 1990s, for example, Microsoft gained some notoriety for its “embrace, ex-
tend, and extinguish” (EEE) strategy, a corporate ruse intended to deter startups and other
competitors from the company’s theater of operations. In 2001, United States v. Microsoft
recommended the breakup of the corporation, charging the company with abusing its market
position in the so-called “browser wars,” leading to the creation of a “kill zone” for would-be
competitors. The ruling against Microsoft was overturned on appeal, but the findings of fact
in the case were not.
For industry insiders like Albert Wenger, an early investor at Twitter, “[t]he kill zone is a
real thing,” representing a powerful deterrent not only to would-be competitors but also to
innovation, since the evidence suggests that the rewards in winner-take-all markets now sys-
tematically favor capital and scale, rather than innovation per se (Schechter, 2018; Kamepalli et
al., 2020).2 The existence of kill zones — predatory spaces located around (or “under”) the re-
serves of the platform giants—has become a socioeconomic fact of life. In fields like enterprise
software and online retail in particular, platforms have practically become themarket, such that
successful third-party firms canbemonitored, stalked, andpicked off atwill (Economist, 2018).
According to Margarethe Vestager, executive vice president at the European Commission, the
pivotal question has become “whether or not these markets will be open and contestable and
innovative, or if they will just be governed by these walled gardens of de facto monopolies”
(quoted in Satariano, 2020, p. A1). Zuboffmaintains that an appropriate response to the prob-
lemof tech companies gone “rogue” is the restoration (or establishment) of amore competitive
market order, supplemented by consumer protections (see Morozov, 2019). But the implica-
tion seems to be that anticompetitive and predatory behavior is somehow aberrant. On the
contrary, “many platforms by their very nature prove to be winner-take-all markets” (Kenney
& Zysman, 2016, p. 3, emphasis added; Parker et al., 2016; Lynch, 2017). Or as Christophers
(2020, p. 206) succinctly puts it, “monopolization is a feature, not a bug.” The antimarket
does indeed seem to be the true home of platform capitalism.
3 Zones d’Opacité
For Braudel, the home of capitalism was a hidden abode of sorts, an occluded realm of hege-
monically embedded power relations scarcely “discernible to the naked eye,” the favored sub-
jects ofwhich practiced a “sophisticated art open only to a few initiates atmost” (Braudel, 1982,
p. 455; 1981, pp. 23–24). Capitalism is seen as a “world of privilege andmonopoly” (Day, 1980,
p. 510), in which socioeconomic elites “are engaged in circuits and calculations that ordinary
people [know] nothing of,” such as foreign exchange, long-distance trade, and exotic credit
arrangements (Braudel, 1981, p. 24). The operations of platform firms — with their algorith-
mic manipulations, expert workforces, and unprecedented surveillance capacities — are by no
means out of place on such a list. In fact, as Shira Ovide remarks, “tech companies [have been
constructed] around software that is designed not to be understood by outsiders.”
Fewpeople on the outside can truly understand howAmazon influences the prices
of products we buy on its site or at other retailers; assess fears that Google funnels
people to its ownwebsites or that Apple steers people to its own apps; or peer into
2. Note that today, capital, scale, and therefore monopoly power are commonly (mis)represented as “innova-
tion” in the technology-saturated discourse that surrounds Big Tech and the platform phenomenon.
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Facebook’s strategy to squash rivals in their cribs. All of this is, by design, shrouded
in secrecy and mystery (Ovide, 2020, pp. 1–2, emphasis added).
Even though this is a world that Braudel never got to see, and could scarcely have conceived,
its pervasive culture of secrecy and obfuscation would have come as no surprise. As Waller-
stein (1991, p. 355) observes, Braudel held that the stratospheric layer that was capitalism’s
true home was opaque “because the capitalists wanted it so,” complete (market) transparency
being “unthinkable.” In contrast to the sunlit world of themarket, “real capitalists,” with their
power plays, predatory behaviors, and monopolistic practices, are creatures of the shadows.
The platform corporations — with their ubiquitous presence in everyday life and pervasive
reach across highest reaches of culture and politics — may be hidden in plain sight, “right in
front of our faces” (Wu, 2018, p. 11), yet the dimensions, depth, and full implications of their
powers remain largely beyond grasp, if not view, not least for those with an interest in curtail-
ing, regulating, or countering those powers. Again, this is a form of “dominance […] hidden
from view” (Rahman & Thelen, 2019, p. 180, emphasis added). Tim Wu consequently joins
those that equate the platform era with the Gilded Age, portraying the powers of the digital
moguls as new-age manifestations of “kingly prerogative.”
That corporations occupying monopoly positions, and operating at the fringes of regula-
tion, should have an interest in discretion, if not secrecy, is hardly unfathomable, and neither
of course is it limited to the platform giants. While cultures of detachment and secrecy are, as
Braudel emphasizes, as old as capitalism itself, these cultures exhibit a particular form in the
platform era. The masters of the digital universe have been especially scrupulous, indeed effec-
tive, in their defenses of the principle (and space) of self-regulation, being shielded not only by
well-resourced lobbying operations, but also by thick curtains of technological determinism
and futurism, sustained by (new) cultural circuits of capitalism (see Thrift, 2005).
One of the things that digital capitalism is particularly good at, Evgeny Morozov (2019,
p. 2) observes, is “cover[ing] its tracks,” the giants of the technology sector having “developed a
panoply of rhetorical and political tricks that insulate them from any pressure from below.”
The imaginary of the platform itself plays a role here, suggesting the provision of support
(from below), like a Twenty-First Century utility service, and calling to mind a level playing
field for “open, neutral, egalitarian” exchange (Gillespie, 2010, p. 352). Indeed, the word plat-
form connotes “something singularly anodyne and innocuous: an operator providing a forum
for others […] while itself remaining outside the fray” (Christophers, 2020, p. 191). Mean-
while, the matrix-like capacities of platforms mean that they can appear to be everywhere but
at the same time remain curiously placeless — their preferred address, appropriately enough,
being “the cloud.” At least prior to the “techlash” of recent years (see Atkinson et al., 2019),
platform moguls were frequently lionized as entrepreneurial mavericks, as the fearless shapers
of new paradigms, and as the seers (and makers) of alternative worlds. Pervasive cultures of
technophilia sustain these performative mystifications, the dominant discourses of which var-
iously obfuscate and misdirect from the black-boxed interior operations of the digital corpo-
rations, which are concealed behind proprietary software systems, functionally illegible (and
practically uncontestable) user agreements, and vast arsenals of legal and lobbying firepower.
Hallmarks of platform discourse, like epochal rhetoric, narratives of digitally-enabled nov-
elty, and celebrations of new-found economic capabilities, also function to detract attention
from underlying continuities and constitutive contexts. A relevant point of reference, yet one
that is frequently overlooked, is the “new economy” moment of the late 1990s, a time of ir-
rational exuberance when romanticized notions of recession-proof economic expansion were
purposefully circulated, as “heroic adventure[s] in innovation” (Feng et al., 2001, p. 468; Frank,
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2000; Cassidy, 2003), through an increasingly integrated financial, business, and technological
media complex. For Thrift (2005, p. 124), “the new economy story worked, andworked to the
extent that it began to re-describe market fundamentals,” including new registers of valuation
yoked to enabling narratives of enigmatic novelty, incommensurability, and unprecedented
growth potential, which inflated an historically large stock-market bubble, while deflecting ar-
guments for regulatory intervention, on the grounds that it would kill the golden goose. Also
symbolically anchored in the technology-finance nexus of the United States, the new-economy
moment combined deregulationist fervor, ideological hubris, and corporate narcissism with
a radical ahistoricism. But soon it was over (at least in this pre-conjunctural form). As Karel
Williams (2001, p. 41) remarked at the time of the new-economy crash, it would be a mistake
to bracket the preceding period off as some aberrant “episode of limited significance which can
nowbe left to the historians of the internet,” thiswas also “business as usual, acting out changes
and continuities which are part of our future as much as our past and which have as much to
do with finance and politics as with technology.”
If the new-economy moment can be seen, in retrospect, as a prelude to the platform con-
juncture, the latter arguably represents something beyond mere continuity, instead marking
processes of extension, intensification, andnormalization (seeMontalban et al., 2019). AsRah-
man and Thelen have argued, “rather than displace previous corporate forms, platform firms
actually often embrace and extend features of those models,” effectively recombining lean, net-
worked, and financializedmodes of organization in conjunctionwith an augmented bundle of
capacities, affordances, and orientations:
Platform firms such as Uber and Amazon were facilitated by previous de-
velopments such as the emphasis on shareholder value, financialization, and
labor-shedding. But they combine these elements with new features to produce
a distinct model of the firm that poses even more extreme challenges to the social
contract […] The shift to the platform firm […] was enabled by technologies that
lowered the cost of monitoring outsourced or franchised operations. Technology
thus allowed lead firms to get the “best of both worlds” — slashing labor costs
and escaping regulatory oversight while at the same time exercising enormous
control throughout their networks of outsourced, franchised, or contract labor,
production, and manufacture (2019, pp. 179, 183).
Langley and Leyshon (2017, p. 14) strike a similar balance, portraying the platformmodel as a
“distinctmode of sociotechnical intermediary and business arrangement,” actively coproduced
with ongoing processes of capitalization, that melds novel features with extant (and extended)
capabilities: the platform corporations, having transcended the so-called stage of “market dis-
ruption,” are now leveraging winner-take-all positions in “digital turf wars.”
Contrary to the image of a digitally powered revolution, driven from within, the supply
lines for these wars of maneuver and attrition unambiguously run back to the venture-capital
industry and the extended apparatus of (U.S. style) financialized capitalism, which has been
hooked on (and into) speculative opportunities in the platform sector in ways that do not
just rhyme with but practically repeat the dynamics of the new-economy bubble. As Langley
and Leyshon point out, U.S. venture-capital funds made nearly $60 billion in investments in
2015, disproportionately targeted on the software sector, the second highest annual total since
the birth of the new economy in 1995. Venture capitalists have positioned themselves, once
again, as sponsors of innovation-rich development, indeed as “knowledge brokers” working to
“fuel the economy of tomorrow” (Zook, 2005; NVCA, 2020). Correspondingly, the platform
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business model has been predicated on unprecedented injections of cash, not just favoring but
bankrolling strategies of long-run market dominance, most conspicuously in the celebrated
“mega-deals” (exceeding $100 million) that are structured so as to capitalize “on the potential
of platforms to realise monopoly rents” (Langley & Leyshon, 2017, p. 11; NVCA, 2020).
Figuring out the internal financial structure of this new new-economy has proved to be
something of a challenge, not least because “[o]ne of the most remarkable things about the
platform-rentier business is that the revenue model is so frequently opaque” (Christophers,
2020, p. 188). Themselves creatures of lax and forgiving regulatory environments (a.k.a. ne-
oliberalism), the big beasts of the platformworld have been consolidating monopoly positions
in the face of precious few impediments. Proactively occupying that “thin layer on top” (Good-
win, 2015, p. 1), high up in the clouds, they have remained largely beyond the reach of earth-
bound regulators. Most conspicuously, the framework of antitrust laws, inherited from the
last century has proved to be largely toothless:
[C]urrent law underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration
across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are
heightened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics
of platform markets incentivize the pursuit of growth over profits, a strategy
that investors have rewarded. Under these conditions predatory pricing becomes
highly rational — even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational. Second, because
online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, [they] control the essential
infrastructure on which their rivals depend. This dual role also enables a platform
to exploit information collected on companies using its services to undermine
them as competitors (Kahn, 2017, p. 803).
That the platform operators remain largely impervious to meaningful regulation is a produced
condition, and one that is being vigorously defended. The evasiveness and lobbying power of
the platform corporations — what Braudel would have called their cunning — have become
matters of public record and political concern. Yet as pressures for regulatory reform have been
building, in Europe, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere, the defenders of corporate free-
dom have been mobilizing to run new kinds of interference. For example, Big Tech now has
its own think tank, the Global Antitrust Institute (GAI), with an address in one of the sub-
urban capitals of neoliberal policy advocacy and a mission to avert regulatory incursions into
the space of the digital economy (see GAI, 2020; Wakabayashi, 2020). Established in 2014 at
GeorgeMasonUniversity’s Antonin Scalia Law Schoolwith funding from leading tech compa-
nies likeAmazon,Google, andQualcomm, theGAIpurports to advocate for “sound economic
analysis” by means of legislative lobbying and “educational” efforts, including a program of in-
stitutes for judges and “competition enforcers,” the reach of which is practically global (GAI,
2019).3 Protesting rather too frequently that its own position and perspective are “balanced,”
its motivations merely those competition-friendly contributor to the “marketplace of ideas,”
theGAI (2020, p. viii) is proving to be a doughty defender of Big Tech’s digital turf, contesting
what it portrays as the “revolutionary zeal” of regulators, while concealing its vested interests
and ideological commitments behind a veneer of scholarly, evidence-based analysis.
3. The programming of the GAI extends far beyond its U.S. base of operations, to Andalusia, Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Hon-
duras, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru,
the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Vietnam, and the courts of the
European Union.
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Likemanyof the institutions that have beenworking in the shadows to protect and advance
the interests of the platform giants, theGAI is not simply a creature of the platformmoment it-
self, but has deeper roots in the neoliberal political project known as law and economics. Advo-
cating for the application of orthodox economic analysis to legal cases, the law-and-economics
movement established one of its beachheads in the Manne Institute for Federal Judges, with
its intensive programs of education in antitrust restraint and regulatory rollbacks (Ash et al.,
2019). The GIA’s training program borrows this model, promulgating a “simplistic vision
of markets” in tandem with a disciplined and consistent message that “the best way to foster
competition is to maintain a hands-off approach to antitrust law” (Wakabayashi, 2020, p. B1).
4 Worlds of (Platform) Capitalism
Braudel reads global capitalism as a pluralized order, “going back a long way” (1984, p. 604),
one shaped by an array of structural logics, organizational principles, cultures, and patterns
of wealth creation. He sees capitalism as a “hydra with a hundred heads,” the protean pow-
ers of which are gathered in and projected from particular places — with world cities serving
as geographical anchoring points for prodigious capacities and “vast orientations,” extending
to the horizon (Braudel, 1982, p. 10; Braudel, quoted in Kinser, 1981b, p. 674). Once again,
Braudel is standing on common ground with Polanyi, with his recognition of socioeconomic
diversity and coexistence, marriedwith a concern to “place” economies in relation both to their
others and to their more-than-economic contexts. Yet whereas Polanyi proceeds by document-
ing different modes of economic integration and their variously “instituted” forms, Braudel
travels a different path, reserving a special place for mapping the rise, fall, and interaction of
various “world-economies,” tied to the programmatic goal of understanding the dynamic spa-
tialities of historical capitalism (seeHelleiner, 1990; Germain, 1996;Harris, 2004). Disinclined
to theorize around an allegedly axial moment of history (such as the apogee of industrial cap-
italism or the great-transformationalist threshold, less still the vantage point of the restructur-
ing present), Braudel seeks to trace rhythms and patterns across an encyclopedic array of con-
junctures and configurations, in search not only of recurrent processes and practices, but also
inflection points, along with moments of discord, dislocation, and contradiction. The irre-
ducibly complex outcome does not resemble a linear sequencing of stages, but instead sets up
“a continuing tension between the forces ofmonopoly (so-called real capitalism) and the forces
of liberation […] through self-controlled activities within a complex of competitive markets”
(Wallerstein, 1991, pp. 360–361). Braudel’s (dis)position is that
critics and observers generally fail to adopt the spatial-temporal horizon needed to
grasp the rules of capitalist game and the ever-changing combination of disparate
local conditions under which the game is played out (Arrighi, 2001, p. 116).
Extending the spatiotemporal horizons of analysis to the point of commensurability with the
globalizing rules of the capitalist game amounts to an undeniably demanding remit, to theorize
across conjunctural difference, to situate and to historicize, and to engage with plural andmul-
tipolar worlds always in (relational) transformation. This is not a recipe for the refinement of
narrowly-drawn ideal types or extrapolation from putatively paradigmatic sites, but for search-
ing inquiries across the “components” (or “fragments”) of an evolving and variegated world
economy, with an eye to the “continual reshuffling of the components with which the key
capitalist players become temporarily and instrumentally identified in their ceaseless pursuit of
profit” (Arrighi, 2001, p. 119).
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Braudel is careful to specify what he calls “world-economies” (in a particular translation of
the termWeltwirtschaft), each of which “only concerns a fragment of the world, an economi-
cally autonomous section of the planet able to provide for most of its own needs,” the internal
linkages and exchanges around which endow “a certain organic unity” (Braudel, 1984, p. 22).
World-economies each have their own structural logics and organizational principles, indeed
their own rhythms of operation (or “world times”); they each exhibit characteristic patterns
of practice, culture, and consciousness (mentalité), displaying different fusions of capitalist
and state power. Revealed in the “vibrating surface” made by international trade and com-
merce, world-economies function in the fashion of an “arterial system [that] distributes blood
throughout a living organism” (Braudel, 1984, p. 83), each projecting what amount to dif-
ferent modalities of strategic monopoly rule (Helleiner, 1990;Webb, 1992). World-economies
are each structured around a distinctive spatiality, typically anchored to a dominant city-region
(the “logistical heart of its activity”), radiating out through various “lines of force” to “middle
zones” and more distant peripheries. Each in their own way, world-economies concentrate
economic power in the hands of capitalist elites, “powerful merchants [who] lay down the law,
sometimes becoming extraordinarily wealthy,” denizens of the world cities, which in turn be-
come control points for the flow of “[n]ews, merchandise, capital, credit, people, instructions,
[and] correspondence” (Braudel, 1984, p. 27). In the process, a “relative handful of hombres
de negocios” emerge as the “high rollers of economic history” (Day, 1980, pp. 514, 512).
Platform capitalism has hardly broken with these longue-durée patterns. The highest of
rollers of today’s global economy today are the heads of the digital fiefdoms, commanding for-
tunes variously derived fromonline trading zones, infrastructures, andmarketplaces. JeffBezos
of Amazon, Jack Ma of Alibaba, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, Ma Huateng of Tencent, Bill
Gates ofMicrosoft, Larry Page of Alphabet/Google, and others of this not-quite-so-new breed
are redefining the verymeaning ofwealth, while the products and services of their respective op-
erations now reach (regular) customers and (repeat) users numbering in the billions. Notwith-
standing the flat-earth ideology that accompanied the globalization of the digital economy (af-
ter Friedman, 2005), its distinctive geographies of concentrated control and pervasive reach
also bear a more than passing resemblance to Braudel’s world-economies, and their contoured
spheres of influence. Yet the task of mapping the power-geometries of platform capitalism is
really only just beginning.
In one of the few comprehensive studies of the spatial structure of the platform economy,
Evans and Gawer’s (2016) survey of 176 of the biggest corporate players reveals a headquarters
geography dominated by a handful of world-regional control centers, reaching 22 countries
in total, but with intense clustering on the West Coast of the United States. With 64 of the
world’s leading platform corporations, the United States accounts for fully 73% of the sector’s
global market capitalization and 63% of sectoral employment. A distant but not insignificant
second is China, with 63 lead firms and a 22% market share, with Europe and other parts of
Asia accounting for the remaining (relatively modest) balance. These massive concentrations
of platformpower, control, andwealth can be properly described as historic; their world-facing
staging grounds in San Francisco, Seattle, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen echo the hierarchi-
cal geographies of Braudel’s world-economies, albeit in digital form.
Braudelmaintained that the analysis and theorization ofworld-economiesmust attend not
only to their “vibrating surfaces,” but also to their underlying conditions of existence. He be-
lieved that the “only” method capable of shedding light on these “historical monsters” was a
variant of conjunctural history, tracing the “combination of movements” underpinning cap-
italism’s restless topography. Characteristically “lumpy,” conjunctural histories are however
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neither erratic, nor do they tend in a unidirectional fashion towards maturation, equilibrium,
or some teleological destination. Instead, these lumpy historiesmust engage the concretemove-
ments of structural forces, legible as medium-term configurations approximating to the “space
of aKondratieff cycle,” or a quasi-régulationist periodicity spanning several decades (Day, 1980,
p. 509; Vidal, 2019), each of which is associated with a particular patterning (and culture) of
powerful interests and spatial forms (Helleiner, 1990). “Braudel’s conjuncturalism,” Kinser
(1981a, p. 94) remarks, characteristically yields a “tangle of distinctions even as it aims to disen-
tangle,” but functions at its best when specifying “movement toward or away from a change
in pattern,” particularly in relation to the interacting evolution of world-economies.
Suggestive though this conception is, a comprehensivemapping of theworld-economies of
platform capitalism is beyond the scope of the present paper, which must instead suffice with
some brief pointers in this Braudelian direction. In this context, folk accounts provide one
place to start. According to insiders like Marc Andreessen (2011, p. C2), it is “not an accident
thatmany of the biggest recent technology companies are American,” a position of dominance
that he puts down to “[o]ur combination of great research universities, a pro-risk business cul-
ture, deep pools of innovation-seeking equity capital and reliable business and contract law
[that] is unparalleled in theworld.” TheUnited States has certainly benefitted fromfirst-mover
advantages in digital innovation and software development, coupled with especially deep con-
sumer markets. But Andreessen’s reading skirts around an array of more structural factors
behind the preeminent position of the United States in the platform world. Situating the U.S.
in comparative perspective, Rahman andThelen (2019) identify a series of enabling conditions
associatedwith this weakly regulated and pro-corporate variety of capitalism: a fragmented pol-
icy landscape ill-matched to the extra-regulatory entrepreneurship of the platform companies;
a deeply financialized political economy flush with excess supplies of venture capital; a legal
regime conducive to the formation of consumer-investor coalitions, shaped by a tradition of
neoliberal antitrust law that prioritizes consumer welfare (and low prices) over assessments of
market dominance; and a constellation of political forces promoting and legitimizing the inter-
ests of platformcorporations in the absence of countervailingpressures fromorganized labor or
competing fractions of capital (Rahman&Thelen, 2019, pp. 181, 193, 197). This distinctively
American configuration sustains what some observers portray as a quintessentially “neoliberal
narrative of platform competition,” which “lionizes currently dominant firms, looks with sus-
picion on virtually all regulation of them, and gives current consumer interests farmoreweight
than those of other stakeholders” (Pasquale, 2016, p. 317).4
The shape, evolution, and global footprint of platform capitalism cannot be dissociated
from these geographical origins, even as the phenomenon is not reducible to the global diffu-
sion of a Silicon Valley-style model. Outside the United States, platform operators encounter,
adapt to, and interact with quite different regulatory and political worlds, with constitutive
consequences for the actually-existing form of these digitized world-economies. Operating in
the context of a balkanized internet, for example, the Chinese model of platform (state) cap-
italism displays a measure of relative autonomy, following a distinctive path of development,
while at the same time exhibiting parallel patterns of concentratedmonopoly rule and vast spa-
tial reach. Jia et al. (2018, p. 190) remark that “the Chinese market has spawned an entirely
separate ecosystem of platforms and firms, a number of which have grown in size sufficiently
to rival the US platform giants.” The two largest platform operators in China, Alibaba and
Tencent, rank alongside the Big Four tech companies from the United States among the ten
4. The cultural politics of the so-called techlash, coupled with an increasingly restive regulatory climate, may
have disrupted the dynamics of this situation, although at this point the outcomes remain difficult to predict.
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most valuable companies in the world, yet of course they operate in a quite different milieu of
state-capital relations. While Chinese platform operators lack the global reach of their Ameri-
can counterparts, their near-exclusive access to a domestic market of nearly 900 million inter-
net users has sustained analogous processes of scale-driven network effects, including an “in-
frastructural” presence in the markets for retail goods (Alibaba), services (Meituan-Dianping),
credit (Huabei), media (Tencent), and information (Baidu). These and other operators have
been expanding into a range neighboring Asian markets.5
Braudel cautions against reading the monopoly powers of capitalists as if they are indepen-
dently and unilaterally secured, insisting instead that they are deeply imbricated with those of
capitalist states, sometimes acting as the enablers or guarantors of extra-competitive positions,
elsewhere policing the rules of competition by “contain[ing] the forces of the anti-market”
(Wallerstein, 1991, p. 457). Ultimately, “[c]apitalism only triumphs,” Braudel (1977, p. 64)
avers, “when it becomes identified with the state,” its privileged position “guaranteed by, incar-
nated in, the hegemonic power” (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 357). Platform operators in the United
States have thrived in a context of a permissive and partly incapacitated antitrust regime, insti-
tutional fragmentation, and an entrenched culture of lax regulation. On the other hand, it has
been with recourse to its own variety of strategic discretion that China’s party-state has “given
tech firms such as Alibaba and Tencent just enough space to grow into giants” (Economist,
2020, p. 9; cf. Zheng & Huang, 2018). The Chinese platform operators have benefited from
what Zheng andHuang (2018) portray as a “state sponsorship” system, including preferential
status in strategic policy projects like the “Internet Plus” strategy, introduced in 2015 with the
goal of “creat[ing] a new engine for economic growth” via the expansion of home-grown tech
companies. Under this arrangement, support is provided for the internationalizationof leading
tech firms; party-state actors side with platform operators in labor disputes with gig-economy
workers; the internet market is aggressively protected from foreign entrants; and substantial
sources of capital are advanced to platform startups.
Yet alongside these points of difference, there are also certain resonances across the Chi-
nese and American cases, mainly in relation to the regulation of platform competition. Chi-
nese competition law is weakly institutionalized and inconsistently enforced, such that there
have been few, if any, impediments to the merger and acquisition strategies of leading tech
firms, while the tendential monopolization of the massive market for electronic payments has
attracted hardly any attention from antitrust regulators (see Jia & Kenney, 2016; Coe & Yang,
2020). The outcomes of this approach are not dramatically dissimilar to those described in the
U.S., where since the 1970s antitrust doctrines have been revised in accordance with Chicago-
style price theory, diluting the concept of entry barriers and equating consumer welfare with
corporate efficiency (Khan, 2017; Wu, 2018; Cohen, 2019). There is a sharper distinction,
however, with the competition laws of the European Union, where a succession of antitrust
investigations have been launched against Google in the past decade, and cases are being built
against Amazon and Apple (Michaels & Schechner, 2020; see also Kang et al., 2020). Beyond
this, the European policy landscape is less exposed to the kinds of regulatory evasion and ar-
bitrage on which American platforms have thrived (see Rahman & Thelen, 2019).6 Table 1
5. The rapacious activities of Chinese platform firms in India, for example, have included the purchase of equity
stakes in a number of local startups and significant penetration of Chinese apps— opening gambits in what
has been styled as a “techColdWar,”waged across the subcontinent between theU.S. giants and theirChinese
counterparts (Ruehl et al., 2020).
6. It may be no coincidence that Europe has been a less accommodating home for platform enterprises, fewer
than 30 of the top 200 being headquartered in the region. Most of these are concentrated in the United
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provides a schematic overview of some of the major points of regulatory difference between
theUnited States, China, and the EuropeanUnion, reflecting a discontinuous pattern of inter-
actions between states, institutional and legal orders, and the unevenly developing modalities
of the platform model. In light of the distinctive transnational footprints displayed by each
of the major platform operators, coupled with the complex interdependencies between differ-
ent markets and regulatory regimes, this table should not be read as some approximation of
free-standing “varieties” of platform capitalism, more as an input to the task of mapping its
variegated zones of expansion-cum-transformation.
Paralleling these evolving (regulatory) geographies of platform capitalism, there are also seg-
mentations, organizational concentrations, and functional divisions that appear to bemore its
ownmaking. As powerful shapers of their ownworld-economies, platforms occupy, transform
and rematerialize their markets and operating environments in different ways. They host, fa-
cilitate, mediate, and govern a wide array of interactions; they work with a diverse repertoire of
revenuemodels and functional architectures; and they variously remake technical and social di-
visions of labor according to their specific requirements. Althoughmost of themajor platform
operators may be engaged, in some fashion or another, in “restructuring the space of capital-
ist accumulation” (Kenney & Zysman, 2020, p. 55), both the form and the consequences of
these restructuring processes vary in complex conjunction with the regulatory and corporate
geographies of this (emergent) conjunctural formation.
Would-be cartographers of the world(s) of platform capitalism, however, are hardly facing
conditions of unprincipled and unpatterned complexity, since there has been valuable work on
different ways to systematically engage and organize its attendant contours and variegations.
For example, Brett Christophers’ suggestive schema separates out four modes of intermedia-
tion: labor platforms, throughwhich human labor power is bought and sold; capital platforms,
which facilitate the sale or letting of capital assets, such as real estate; commodity platforms,
through which commodities, goods, and services are traded; and attention platforms, which
seek to monetize and revalue the attention of their users (Christophers, 2020, p. 188). This
typology usefully positions platforms on something akin to a Braudelian plane, foreground-
ing their role as capitalist intermediaries variously insinuated into the transactions, networks,
chains, and relations that connect laborers with employers, sellers with buyers, producers with
consumers, and so on.7
Kingdom, where the regulatory order is more closely aligned with that of the United States, such that plat-
forms have enjoyed “free reign to create newmarkets and disintermediate existing ones” (Christophers, 2020,
p. 200).
7. Parallel approaches to classification emphasize revenue and profitability (see Srnicek, 2017a), different types
of activities, such as transactions, innovation, investment, or some combination of these (see Evans &Gawer,
2016; Kenney & Zysman, 2016), or distinctions drawn between platforms operating within single firms,
across supply-chains, or within industries (see Gawer, 2014).
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Table 1: Spaces of Platform Capitalism I: Regulatory Geographies
Table 2 takes this schema as a point of departure: Uber is offered as an example of a labor
platform; Airbnb andAmazon stand in as proxies for capital and commodity platforms, respec-
tively; and Google exemplifies an attention platform; to which we add a fifth, the innovation
platform, illustrated by the case of Salesforce.8 Again, the point here is not to reify a taxonomic
categorization, but to illustrate the diversity of the platform economy itself (see also Elder-Vass,
2016; Grabher & König, 2020; Kenney & Zysman, 2020; Vallas & Schor, 2020). These might
be thought of as (some of) the coexisting world-economies of platform capitalism, each reach-
ing out from its own “home” territories across an array of markets, infrastructural networks-
cum-scales, and transactional spaces. Some, like Amazon for example, are architects of their
8. Evans and Gawer (2016, p. 9) define innovation platforms this way: “a technology, product or service that
serves as a foundation on top of which other firms (loosely organized into an innovative ecosystem) develop
complementary technologies, products or services.”
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own (unevenly contested) labor systems, combining a concentrated managerial core with an
extensive network of workers and “independent” contractors, while others, such as Airbnb,
operate with a tiny cadre of highly-skilled “venture laborers,” mobilizing at a distance a vast
network of platform participants (see Neff, 2012; Stone, 2013).
Table 2: Spaces of Platform Capitalism II: Corporate Geographies
For all this diversity, however, there are cross-cutting characteristics too, some of which
resonate with Braudel’s depictions of world-economies, with their various cores, peripheries,
intermediate zones, and “lines of force.” According to Annabelle Gawer (2014, p. 1240), a
feature common to all platforms is their relianceon“amodular technological architecturemade
up of a core and a periphery,” which in turn is reflected in bespoke accounting regimes and
novel architectures of control (see Kornberger et al., 2017). Organizationally, this materializes
as a separation between a relatively stable core, under the direct control of platform owners,
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and an array of “variable peripheral components” that are differently shaped and developed in
conjunction with platform users (Baldwin &Woodward, 2009, p. 24). This, in turn, is related
to particular regimes of power and control.
Vallas and Schor (2020, p. 273) argue that platforms succeed — in facilitating trade,
connecting users, or capturing value — when they are able to “externalize responsibility and
control over economic transactions while still exercising concentrated power.” Kornberger
et al. (2017, p. 79) likewise explain that while the operational reach of platforms is “radically
distributed,” a largely invariant condition is that “power remains centralized.” As Table 2
illustrates, platform operators centralize and concentrate power in diverse ways, but they
all do it: labor platforms like Uber deploy algorithmic systems and regulatory evasion to
manage a distributed fleet of nominally self-employed drivers; capital platforms like Airbnb
reserve their right to exclude users and to ban some rental activities; innovation platforms like
Salesforce retain control over the operating system upon which other applications are built.
The monopolization of information on platform participants, their transactions, and even
their desires, is the key resource in this context; in contrast to the always-imperfect information
possessed by conventional market actors, platform operators are positioned so as to monitor
all sides of the transactional relation, actual and potential, mobilizing modes of long-distance
surveillance and control that for Braudel would have been unimaginable — albeit in a strange
way predictable. As Tim Wu (2018, p. 11) has protested, the overlords of today’s platform
fiefdoms “seem to know too much about us,” exercising “too much power over what we see,
hear, do, and even feel.”
5 Conclusion: Platform Power
In July 2020, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, Tim Cook of Apple, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, and
Sundar Pichai of Alphabet were summoned to appear before a panel of the United States
Congress investigating allegations of antitrust violations and other abuses of power, position,
and privilege, a confrontation that some commentators likened to the long-delayed moment
of judgment faced by Big Tobacco a generation before. The confrontation was anticlimactic,
but could yet mark a milestone in a regulatory struggle that seems destined to last for years (see
Kang et al., 2020; Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law, 2020).
The day after the hearings, as chance would have it, the Big Four reported their quarterly earn-
ings. In the throes of an unprecedented collapse of the U.S. economy, ravaged by the COVID-
19 pandemic, the platform firms were thriving. Facebook’s profits almost doubled from the
previous year, while Amazon reported a 40% increase in sales, the Big Four posting combined
profits of $28.6 billion for a quarter in which their aggregate market capitalization ballooned
to $5 trillion. Alongside Big Pharma, the platform giants have been themost significant benefi-
ciaries of the global crisis triggered by the pandemic (see Financial Times, 2020). Even though,
in the early stages of the crisis, the platform operators “felt some sting from the spending slow-
down,” Wakabayashi et al (2020, p. B1) report, this new generation of corporate giants would
demonstrate once again, as occupants of the commanding heights of digital capitalism, that
“they are operating on a different playing field from the rest of the economy.”
In the space of two decades, the world’s leading platform operators have consolidated posi-
tions at the weakly-regulated summit of contemporary capitalism. Taking our cues here from
the creative formulations of Fernand Braudel, for whom capitalist power is always exercised
from a “narrow platform” (Braudel, 1977, p. 113; Day, 1980, p. 108), we have argued in this pa-
per that platforms represent a “new business modelwithin capitalism” (Srnicek, 2017b, p. 254,
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emphasis added), but also that they also stand for something more specific than that— as new
machines for the concentration of power and the monopolization of markets, working from
that “restricted layer” that Braudel called the antimarket, newly constituted as a placeless place
in the clouds with its very own breed of great predators. In a context such as this, which might
be regarded as both familiar and strange, one of the benefits of traveling with Braudel is that
inquiries pointedly beginwithmonopoly power and anticompetitive practices, rather with no-
tions of technologically induced disruption, or the magical properties of network effects.
Platform capitalism, we have argued, represents more than a new way of delivering the
goods (cf. Robinson, 1962), but functions as a machine for concentrating and exploiting
political-economic power. The monopoly practices of platform corporations, as Christophers
(2020) has demonstrated, are a defining feature of this system, not an anomaly or a bug. This
defining feature, however, should not be confused with an eternal andmechanically produced
characteristic, since the conjunctural condition of platform capitalism is neither stable nor
free of contradiction. As Grabher & König (2020, p. 110) conclude, “the various institutional
configurations and regulatory regimes of [the] platform economy” are still very much “in the
making,” leaving open a host of questions concerning how the platform model “might be
combined with, or live alongside other governance models, in various degrees of contradiction
or complementarity.” And as Julie Cohen (2019) has argued, also striking a Polanyian tone,
the distinctive dynamics of platformization will surely be met with countermeasures and
countermovements, although the content and consequences of these counteractions are
ultimately matters of politics, not functional predetermination. The institutional legacies of
double movements played out in the previous century, however, seem to be ill-matched for
this challenging task. New modalities of counterpolitics will surely be required, given the
nature of this particular beast.
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